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TAGS: [PARM](#) [PINS](#) [PREL](#) [AG](#) [IR](#) [IS](#) [IZ](#) [LE](#) [UK](#)
SUBJECT: IRANIAN PUGWASH PARTICIPANTS CLAIM TEHRAN
INDIFFERENT TO SANCTIONS BUT WANTS DIRECT FLIGHTS

REF: A. A) E-MAILS JULY 29-AUG 1 EMB LONDON (GAYLE) TO NEA/IR B. B) LONDON 1645 C. C) DUBAI 28 Classified By: Classified By:

1. (S) Summary: Iranian government advisers at the most recent "Pugwash" Conference on Iran reportedly argued during the August 2-3 seminar
2. (S/NF) International Institute of Strategic Studies non-proliferation expert Mark Fitzpatrick, a retired U.S. Foreign Service Officer with Iranian Participants: from MFA and Jalili/Ahmedinejad Staffs -----

3. (S/NF) Included among invited Iranian participants at the Pugwash event were: Mojtaba Hashemi Samareh, an Ahmadinejad "Principal Advisor Nuclear Issue ----- LONDON 00002101 002 OF 005

4. (S) As the conference was held shortly before the P5 1 received Jalili's one-page letter replying to the group's nuclear offer, Iranians

5. (S) U.S. participants underlined U.S. policy on Iran post-election would be unaffected by which party won and advised Iranians not to expect

6. (S/NF) A mid-level Iranian MFA official argued the Secretary's signature and the Burns visit were actually "negative" signals, in that they

7. (S/NF) After broad discussion of an international consortium, including a listing of the numerous conditions (e.g., facilities above ground

8. (S) Regarding scientific exchanges whereby scientists from both countries would meet to talk through ways to widen the "thin line" separating Sanctions: Iranians Doth Protest Too Much ----- LONDON 00002101 003 OF 005

9. (S/NF) Javad Hammanpour spoke privately to Fitzpatrick on the margins, asking hypothetically how Iran would benefit "if we suspended."

10. (S/NF) Fitzpatrick was skeptical of the Iranians' claim that sanctions do not matter to them; he said the Iranians on this point were Interest Section: Discuss Flights First -----

11. (S) The interest section issue was raised by the U.S. side. Samareh repeated Ahmedinejad's words, that if it was formally proposed that

12. (S/NF) Other Iranians continued to press Fitzpatrick on the margins on the direct flight issue. Fitzpatrick replied this would likely Israel: Rhetoric -----

13. (S/NF) U.S. comments on Israeli anxiety prompted a strong reaction, about Iran not responding to threats, as well as comments that Israel Afghanistan: An Iranian Focus -----

14. (S) In the larger sessions Iranian comments centered on the lack of help it gets in fighting drug trafficking amidst increasing opium production Embassy Comment -----

15. (S/NF) Given the make-up of the Iranian delegation (limited to Jalili-Ahmedinejad aides and to the MFA) some of the conference's apparent

A) Fitzpatrick noted the negotiating style of some participants, such as Ahmedinejad advisor Samareh, seemed at times to veer from rational,

B) in contrast with MFA reps who repeated rigidly anti-U.S. formulae, Jalili's deputies, at least in private, seemed to show slightly more flexibility

C) Ahmedinejad advisor Samareh's broad dismissal of a consortium seems consistent with information (ref c) that the May Iran proposal, which

D) finally, the Iranians' profession of indifference to sanctions, which Fitzpatrick found unconvincing, went hand in hand, and incongruously TUTTLE